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Article
Asylum’s Interpretative Impasse:
Interpreting “Persecution” and “Particular Social
Group” Using International Human Rights Law
Nicholas R. Bednar and Margaret Penland
Abstract
The United States is in the midst of two crises: an
overwhelming number of refugees seeking asylum in the United
States and an interpretive impasse. Who is a “refugee”? As the
Board of Immigration Appeals tightens its interpretation of
“refugee” amidst the United States’ latest refugee crisis,
practitioners must utilize every available tool at their disposal to
advance their client’s asylum claims. This Article guides
practitioners on when and how to use international human rights
law arguments in emerging types of asylum claims, particularly
those of child applicants and those based on domestic violence.
To create a holistic picture, this Article considers the following:
(1) current interpretations of the definition of “refugee” under
United States law; (2) the incorporation of international human
rights law in United States domestic law; (3) sources of
international human rights law that may aid in advancing
interpretative arguments; and (4) how practitioners can
effectively use these sources in legal arguments.
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Introduction
The United States is in the midst of two crises: a refugee
crisis and an interpretative impasse. In 2013, U.S. Customs and
Border Patrol (“CBP”) apprehended 38,833 unaccompanied
minors, primarily from El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and
Mexico.1 In addition to these unaccompanied minors, thousands
of women have fled to the United States to escape gang violence
and domestic abuse in their home countries. In 2013, CBP
apprehended 36,174 adults who expressed a fear of returning to
their countries of origin, up from 5,369 in 2009.2 Many of these
refugees have experienced domestic violence, child abuse, and
gang-related violence in their countries of origin. Fortunately,
many nonprofit organizations attempt to provide these refugees
with pro bono counsel to file for asylum.3 Unfortunately, current
interpretations of the definition of “refugee” make it difficult for
practitioners to convince adjudicators of the validity of their
claims.
To prevail on an asylum claim, an applicant must establish
that he or she is a “refugee” as defined by the Immigration and
Nationality Act (“INA”). Section 101(a)(42)(a) defines a “refugee”
as:
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person’s
nationality . . . and who is unable or unwilling to return
to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself
of the protection of, that country because of persecution
or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion . . . .4

1. See UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, CHILDREN
RUN 16 (2014), http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/about-us/background
/56fc266f4/children-on-the-run-full-report.html.
2. See id. at 4.
3. See, e.g., Jill Bachelder, Advocates for Human Rights Establishes
National Asylum Hotline, THE JOURNAL (Aug. 3, 2015), http://www.journal
mpls.com/news/2015/08/advocates-for-human-rights-establishes-nationalasylum-hotline/. We do not mean to suggest that the need for attorneys in the
immigration context is easily met. It is not. Much could be done to increase
reputation of at-risk immigrant groups in asylum and removal proceedings.
What programs and changes to the immigration system could better facilitate
representation of refugees is beyond the scope of this Article.
4. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012).
ON THE
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The basic elements of an asylum claim are derived from this
definition, which Congress adopted in the Refugee Act of 1980
(the “1980 Refugee Act”). An asylum applicant must show he or
she is (1) unable or unwilling to return to their home country, (2)
because of persecution, (3) by the government or someone the
government cannot or will not control, (4) on account of, (5) “race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion.”5
The 1980 Refugee Act derives its definition of refugee from
the 1951 Refugee Convention (“Refugee Convention”) and the
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (the “1967
Protocol”).6 Neither the 1980 Refugee Act nor the international
treaties upon which it is based define “persecution” or
“particular social group.”7 Therefore, the Board of Immigration
Appeals (“BIA”), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
(“USCIS”), and federal courts have interpreted these undefined
terms. Practitioners can use international human rights
treaties, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee
(“UNHCR”) guidelines, and sister signatories’ case law as
interpretive tools to support various asylum claims.
Recent case law interpreting “refugee,” however, has not
been friendly to asylum seekers.8 What, then, can persuade an
adjudicator to accept an applicant’s proposed interpretation of
“persecution,” “particular social group,” or other ambiguous

5. See id. In addition to the above criteria, an asylum applicant must show
that he or she is applying within one year of arriving in the United States and
is not barred under INA § 208. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2012). These criteria,
however, are not related to the definition of “refugee” and this Article does not
explore them.
6. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012), with Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees art. 1, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 (entered into force
Apr. 22, 1954) [hereinafter Refugee Convention], and Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees art. 1, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter Refugee
Protocol]. The definitions of the 1980 Refugee Act and the 1951 Refugee
Convention vary slightly, though any variation is seemingly insignificant in
asylum adjudications. For reference, the 1951 Refugee Convention defines a
refugee as any person who: “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing
to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or
who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former
habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is
unwilling to return to it.” Refugee Convention art. 1.
7. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012); Refugee Convention art. 1, supra note
6; Refugee Protocol art. 1, supra note 6.
8. See infra Part I.B.
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terms included in the 1980 Refugee Act?9 Practitioners should
utilize every possible tool at their disposal to convince asylum
adjudicators to accept their interpretations of “refugee.” In one
of its most influential decisions, Matter of Acosta, the BIA
acknowledged that “it is appropriate for [adjudicators] to
consider various international interpretations of [the Refugee
Convention]” in construing the elements of “refugee.”10 This
Article expands upon the general guidance found in Board of
Immigration Appeals’ case law and guides practitioners on when
and how to use international human rights law arguments in
emerging types of asylum claims.
Part I of this Article explains how Congress incorporated the
1951 Refugee Convention and its subsequent 1967 Protocol into
the 1980 Refugee Act. Next, it explains how the BIA and circuit
courts have subsequently interpreted the 1980 Refugee Act. Part
II surveys the incorporation of international law into United
States domestic law and suggests that while international
human rights law is rarely binding unless incorporated into
United States domestic law, practitioners may persuade judges
to use international human rights law in interpreting the
various pieces of the 1980 Refugee Act’s definition of “refugee.”
Part III explores various instruments of international law, their
interpretations, and the ways in which practitioners can use
these instruments in international human rights arguments. To
do this, Part III examines UNHCR materials, human rights
treaties, United Nations General Assembly Resolutions (“GA
Resolution”), and foreign case law.
This Article concludes with Part IV, where we apply
international human rights law to two fictional cases. Part IV(A)
analyzes a hypothetical case of a Salvadoran woman fleeing from
her abusive boyfriend. Part IV(B) applies our arguments to a
fourteen-year-old Salvadoran child fleeing gang violence. Both of
these sections provide a roadmap for practitioners to follow in
making their own international human rights law arguments.

9. This question was initially prompted to the University of Minnesota
Immigration and Human Rights Clinic by Advocates for Human Rights, a nonprofit that finds pro bono attorneys for asylum seekers in Minneapolis,
Minnesota. This Article is our response to that question.
10. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 220 (B.I.A. 2004) (overruled in
part by Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987) (holding that
Matter of Acosta’s “clear probability” and “well-founded fear” standards are not
meaningfully different, and therefore that portion of Matter of Acosta is
overruled)).
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I. IMPLEMENTATIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS OF
THE 1951 REFUGEE CONVENTION AND THE
1967 PROTOCOL IN UNITED STATES
DOMESTIC LAW
To understand how international human rights law can be
used to expand interpretations of the definition of “refugee,” it is
first necessary to explain how the United States immigration
system currently interprets the term. Part I(A) examines the
adoption of the 1951 Refugee Convention definition of “refugee”
in the 1980 Refugee Act, and concludes that the interpretation
of these sources of law has been left to the BIA and United States
courts. Part I(B) surveys how the BIA and United States courts
have interpreted the 1980 Refugee Act. In particular, Part I(B)
addresses two key terms: “particular social group” and
“persecution.” Both Part I(B)(i) and Part I(B)(ii) conclude that
the standards and interpretations provided by the BIA are too
ambiguous and vague, leaving ample room for practitioners to
utilize international human rights arguments in asylum claims.
A. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE 1951 REFUGEE
CONVENTION, THE 1967 PROTOCOL, AND THE 1980
REFUGEE ACT
Prior to World War II, no internationally accepted definition
of “refugee” existed.11 In light of the significant number of
displaced persons after the war, however, the United Nations
convened “a conference of plenipotentiaries in Geneva . . . to
consider an international agreement to provide legal protection
to refugees.”12 As a result, the 1951 Refugee Convention adopted
the first internationally recognized definition of “refugee” 13:

11. See Maryellen Fullerton, A Comparative Look at Refugee Status Based
on Persecution Due to Membership in a Particular Social Group, 26 CORNELL
INT’L L.J. 505, 506 (1993) (“The early international agreements related to
refugees tended to focus on particular refugee groups, such as Russians,
Armenians, or, even more specifically, German refugees from the Saar.”
(internal citations omitted)).
12. Id. at 508 (“The 1951 Convention, which has been signed by 109
governments to date, was the first international compact to adopt a universal
refugee definition, rather than one tied to a particular national or ethnic
group.”).
13. See Daniel J. Steinblock, Interpreting the Refugee Definition, 45 UCLA
L. REV. 733, 739 (1998).
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As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion, is outside the
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that
country; or who, not having a nationality and being
outside the country of his former habitual residence as a
result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is
unwilling to return to it.14

The Refugee Convention, however, restricted the refugee
definition “both temporally and geographically.”15 As described
within the treaty, the individual must have been displaced
“before 1 January 1951.”16 Furthermore, the displacement must
have occurred as a “result of events” occurring before the
enumerated date, granting refugee status only to individuals in
a geographical area affected by the war.17 The 1967 Protocol
removed the temporal and geographical restrictions, creating a
universally applicable definition of “refugee.”18
The United States is not a party to the Refugee Convention,
but has signed the 1967 Protocol.19 As discussed more
thoroughly in Part II, the Refugee Convention is a non-selfexecuting treaty and is binding on the United States only to the
extent that Congress has incorporated it into domestic law.20
The only language from either the 1967 Protocol or the Refugee
Convention that Congress has incorporated in the 1980 Refugee
Act is the definition of “refugee”:

14. Refugee Convention art. 1, supra note 6.
15. See Steinblock, supra note 13, at 739. As the refugee definition reveals,
the Convention initially only covered individuals who were persecuted before
January 1, 1951 “as a result of” the events of World War II. See Refugee
Convention art. 1, supra note 6.
16. Refugee Convention art. 1, supra note 6.
17. Id.
18. See Steinblock, supra note 13, at 739; see also Refugee Protocol art. 1,
supra note 6 (stating that a refugee is “any person within the definition of article
I of the Convention as if the words ‘As a result of events occurring before 1
January 1951 . . . ‘ and the words ‘ . . . as a result of such events’, in article I A
(2) were omitted’”).
19. See Refugee Convention art. 1, supra note 6; see also Refugee Protocol
art. 1, supra note 6.
20. Matter of D-J-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 572, 584 n.8 (A.G. 2003).
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[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person’s
nationality . . . and who is unable or unwilling to return
to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself
of the protection of, that country because of persecution
or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion . . . .21
Thus, the United States is not bound by any other articles
of the Refugee Convention. Moreover, the United States is bound
by the refugee definition as Congress defined it, not as it has
been interpreted by other foreign authorities. As such, the BIA
and United States courts are the primary interpreters of the
1980 Refugee Act.22 Given the difficult task of interpreting the
broad definition of “refugee,” UNHCR documents and foreign
case law—while only non-binding, persuasive authority—may
provide guidance to the BIA and United States courts.
B. INTERPRETATION OF “REFUGEE” BY UNITED STATES
COURTS
The ambiguity of the 1980 Refugee Act leaves space for
expansive interpretation by the BIA and United States courts.
This section covers the two of the most ambiguous—and
therefore two of the most contested—terms: “particular social
group” and “persecution.”
1. Interpreting “Particular Social Group”23
In 1986, the BIA interpreted the phrase “particular social
group” for the first time in Matter of Acosta.24 Using the

21. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012). Compare id., with Refugee Convention
art. 1, supra note 6, and Refugee Protocol art. 1, supra note 6. The variation
between refugee definitions of the 1980 Refugee Act and 1951 Refugee
Convention does not matter for purposes of interpretation.
22. See Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 232–33 (applying the doctrine
of ejusdem generis to the definition of “refugee” in order to interpret “particular
social group”).
23. For more on the “particular social group standard,” its evolution, and
the struggles it presents to practitioners, see Nicholas R. Bednar, Social Group
Semantics: The Evidentiary Requirements of “Particularity” and “Social
Distinction” in Pro Se Asylum Adjudications, 100 MINN. L. REV. 355 (2015).
24. See Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233.
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interpretative canon of ejusdem generis,25 the BIA created an
“immutable characteristic” standard to evaluate whether or not
the asylum applicant articulated a valid “particular social
group.” To satisfy the immutable characteristic standard,
members of the proposed particular social group must share a
characteristic “that either is beyond the power of an individual
to change or that is so fundamental to his identity or conscience
that it ought not be required to be changed.”26 Under this
standard, the BIA and circuit courts have accepted broad
particular social groups, including those defined by
homosexuality,27 forced marriage,28 ethnicity,29 and a variety of
other immutable characteristics.30
The majority of federal circuits embraced the Acosta
standard, and for nearly two decades it remained the primary
test for determining the validity of a particular social group.31 In
2002, following the promulgation of a different interpretation of
25. Ejusdem generis is a textual canon employed by courts to interpret
general terms using the specific terms surrounding the general term as context.
See James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007).
26. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at. 233. For a more thorough analysis
of the Acosta standard, see IRA J. KURZBAN, KURZBAN’S IMMIGRATION LAW
SOURCEBOOK 622–28 (14th ed. 2014), and REGINA GERMAIN, ASYLUM PRIMER
50–58 (6th ed. 2010).
27. See, e.g., Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819, 822 (B.I.A.
1990).
28. See Gao v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 62, 70 (2d Cir. 2006).
29. See, e.g., Ahmed v. Keisler, 504 F.3d 1183, 1198–99 (9th Cir. 2007)
(finding Bihari living in Bangladesh to be a particular social group); Ali v.
Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 780, 784–87 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding gang-rape of asylum
seeker was on account of her membership in the Midgan clan of Somalia);
Mihalev v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 722, 726 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding Bulgarian
national of Roma descent constituted a particular social group).
30. See, e.g., Lwin v. INS, 144 F.3d 505, 510–12 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding
that parents of Burmese student dissidents constituted a particular social
group); Gebremichael v. INS, 10 F.3d 28, 35–36 (1st Cir. 1993) (“There can, in
fact, be no plainer example of a social group based on common identifiable and
immutable characteristics than that of the nuclear family.”). For a substantial
list of additional cases finding the existence of a particular social group, see
KURZBAN, supra note 26, at 622–28.
31. See, e.g., Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187, 1199 (10th Cir. 2005);
Castellano-Chacon v. INS, 341 F.3d 533, 546–48 (6th Cir. 2003); Lwin v. INS,
144 F.3d 505, 511 (7th Cir. 1998); Safaie v. INS, 25 F.3d 636, 640 (8th Cir. 1994);
Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233 (3rd Cir. 1993); Alvarez-Flores v. INS, 909 F.2d 1, 7
(1st Cir. 1990). But see Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1574–75 (9th
Cir. 1986) (adopting the “voluntary associational relationship” test). Since
Sanchez-Truijllo, the Ninth Circuit has shifted more towards the Acosta
standard. See Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000)
(overruled by Thomas v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 177 (9th Cir. 2006) (cert. granted,
judgment vacated on other grounds, 547 U.S. 183 (2006)).
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“particular social group” by Australia, the UNHCR proposed a
uniform definition in its 2002 Guidelines on International
Protection:
[A] group of persons who share a common characteristic
other than their risk of being persecuted, or who are
perceived as a group by society. The characteristic will
often be one which is innate, unchangeable, or which is
otherwise fundamental to identity, conscience or the
exercise of one’s human rights.32
The UNHCR’s uniform definition attempted to merge Acosta’s
immutable characteristic test and Australia’s social visibility
test by allowing the refugee to prove either to establish the
existence of a particular social group.
Following the publication of the UNHCR Guidelines, in
2006 the BIA reinterpreted “particular social group” to include
the elements of “social visibility” and “particularity” in addition
to an immutable characteristic.33In Matter of S-E-G-, the BIA
articulated its understanding of these elements. The BIA
defined the test for particularity as “whether the proposed
description is sufficiently ‘particular,’ or is ‘too amorphous . . . to
create a benchmark for determining group membership.’”34 To
satisfy the element of social visibility, the applicant must show
that his or her particular social group is “recognizable by others
in the community . . . considered in the context of the country of
concern and the persecution feared.”35 The BIA did not adopt
alternative immutable characteristic or social visibility tests as
suggested by the UNHCR Guidelines but rather required the
refugee to prove that the particular social group shared an
immutable characteristic, was socially visible, and was defined
with particularity.
In two more recent cases, Matter of M-E-V-G- and Matter of
W-G-R-, the BIA clarified its interpretation of particularity and
social visibility. According to the BIA, the purpose of
32. See Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 582 (2008) (citing the UNHCR
guidelines).
33. See generally Matter of C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 957–61 (B.I.A. 2006)
(discussing whether “noncriminal informants” or “noncriminal drug informants
working against the Cali drug cartel” are valid particular social groups in the
context of that case).
34. Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 584 (emphasis added) (citing DavilaMejia v. Mukasey, No. 07-2567, 2008 WL 2630085, at *3 (8th Cir. July 7, 2008)).
35. Id. at 586–87.
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particularity is to allow the adjudicator to clearly identify who is
and who is not a group member.36 Therefore, the particular
social group must “be discrete and have definable boundaries—
it must not be amorphous, overbroad, diffuse, or subjective.”37 In
addition, the BIA renamed “social visibility” as “social
distinction” in order to alleviate confusion and explain that
“[l]iteral or ‘ocular’ visibility is not . . . a prerequisite.”38 Social
distinction requires a particular social group to “be perceived as
a group by society,” not just the persecutor.39 The BIA
acknowledged some overlap between the elements of
particularity and social distinction but noted that particularity
addresses the “‘outer limits’ of a group’s boundaries,” while social
distinction addresses whether “society would perceive a
proposed group as sufficiently separate or distinct.”40
The BIA and circuit courts use particularity and social
distinction to deny asylum to individuals from Central America,
whose particular social groups allegedly cannot meet these
criteria. In particular, the BIA has yet to accept particular social
groups involving gangs or drug cartels. In Matter of C-A-, the
BIA concluded that a particular social group of “noncriminal
informants” was “too loosely defined.” 41 Similarly, in Matter of
M-E-V-G-, the BIA rejected the particular social group of
“Honduran youth who have been actively recruited by gangs but
who have refused to join because they oppose the gangs.”42 In
Matter of W-G-R-, the BIA denied asylum to an applicant
claiming persecution as a member of the particular social group
defined as “former members of the Mara 18 gang in El Salvador
who have renounced their gang membership.”43 Circuit court
precedent has also illustrated a hesitation to accept gang-based
asylum claims.44 Despite its unwillingness to accept these
36. See Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 214 (B.I.A. 2014) (“A
particular social group must be defined by characteristics that provide a clear
benchmark for determining who falls within the group.”).
37. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 239 (B.I.A. 2014).
38. Id. at 238. The Seventh Circuit had rejected the criterion of “social
visibility,” believing that applicants could only satisfy social visibility by
“pinning a target to their backs.” See Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 616 (7th
Cir. 2009).
39. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 240.
40. Id. at 241 (citing Castellano-Chacon v. INS, 341 F.3d 533, 549 (6th Cir.
2003)).
41. See Matter of C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 957.
42. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 228.
43. Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 209.
44. See, e.g., De Leon-Saj v. Holder, No. 13-60898, 583 F. App’x 429, 430
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particular social groups, the BIA continues to affirm that these
decisions are not a “blanket rejection of all factual scenarios
involving gangs.”45
Particular social groups defined in part by sex have had
more success. In Matter of A-R-C-G-, the only BIA case to uphold
a particular social group since the inception of particularity and
social visibility, the BIA accepted “married women in Guatemala
who are unable to leave their relationship” as a particular social
group.46 In Paloka v. Holder the Second Circuit remanded to the
Immigration Judge (“IJ”) an application involving a particular
social group defined as “unmarried young women in Albania,”
implying that the particular social group was valid.47 Many sexbased particular social groups, however, remain untested and
there has yet to be a BIA or circuit court decision examining
sexual violence in a gang context.
Plenty of other scholars and advocates have acknowledged
the potential constitutional and international law issues brought
by particularity and social distinction.48 Indeed, the National
Immigrant Justice Center declares that particularity “effectively
precludes the use of common parlance labels to describe a
[particular social group], even as the social distinction test
requires that a [particular social group] be limited by
parameters a society would recognize.”49 The purpose of this
Article is not to explore those claims. Rather, this Article hopes
to illustrate how practitioners may use international human
rights law to persuade justices that their particular social group
is protected under the 1980 Refugee Act.

(5th Cir. Nov. 4, 2014) (rejecting “students in Guatemala targeted by gangs”).
Note that per the Fifth Circuit’s rules of Appellate Procedure, this unpublished
opinion may not be used as precedent except in limited circumstances.
45. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. at 251.
46. Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 388–89 (B.I.A. 2014).
47. See Paloka v. Holder, 762 F.3d 191, 194 (2d Cir. 2014).
48. See Brief of Amici Curiae of the American Immigration Lawyers
Association and the Central American Resource Center in Support of Petitioner
at 5–7, Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2013) (No. 09-71571);
Bednar, supra note 23, at 380–86; Benjamin Casper et al., Matter of M-E-V-Gand the BIA’s Confounding Legal Standard for “Membership in a Particular
Social Group,” 14-06 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1, 19 (2014).
49. Nat’l Immigrant Just. Ctr., Particular Social Group Practice Advisory:
Applying for Asylum After Matter of M-E-V-G- and Matter of W-G-R- 3 (2014),
http://immigrantjustice.org/sites/immigrantjustice.org/files/PSG%20Practice%
20Advisory%20and%20Appendices-Final-1.22.16.pdf.
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2. Interpreting “Persecution”

Like “particular social group,” the 1980 Refugee Act does not
define the term “persecution,” but rather leaves its
interpretation to the BIA and federal courts. Matter of Acosta
serves as a starting point for the interpretation of “persecution.”
First, relying in part on the UNHCR Handbook, the BIA
concluded that the applicant must establish that her “primary
motivation for requesting refuge in the United States is ‘fear,’
i.e., a genuine apprehension or awareness of danger in another
country.”50 Examining its case law prior to the enactment of the
1980 Refugee Act, the BIA defined persecution as “a threat to
life or freedom of, or the infliction of suffering or harm upon,
those who differ in a way regarded as offensive.”51 The BIA
created a two-part test from this definition: (1) the “harm or
suffering had to be inflicted upon an individual in order to
punish him for possessing a belief or characteristic a persecutor
sought to overcome;”52 and (2) the “harm or suffering had to be
inflicted either by the government of a country or by persons or
an organization that the government was unable or unwilling to
control.”53 Matter of Acosta, however, says little about what
types of harm would constitute persecution: “[t]he harm or
suffering inflicted could consist of confinement or torture,”54
“[the harm] could consist of economic deprivation or restrictions
so severe that they constitute a threat to an individual’s life or
freedom,”55 and “[g]enerally harsh conditions shared by many
other persons did not amount to persecution.”56
Since Matter of Acosta, the BIA and circuit courts have
continued to refine the definition of persecution. A single
incident of persecution may be sufficient,57 but the adjudicator

50. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 221.
51. Id. at 222 (citing Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d 102, 107 (9th Cir. 1969); Matter
of Maccaud, 14 I. & N. Dec. 429, 434 (B.I.A. 1973) (additional citations omitted)).
52. Id. (quoting Matter of Diaz, 10 I. & N. Dec. 199, 204 (B.I.A. 1963)).
53. Id. (quoting McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312, 1315 (9th Cir. 1981)
(additional citations omitted)).
54. Id. (quoting Blazina v. Bouchard, 286 F.2d 507, 511 (3d Cir. 1961)).
55. Id. (quoting Dunat v. Hurney, 297 F.2d 744, 746 (3d Cir. 1962)
(additional citations omitted)).
56. Id. (quoting Cheng Kai Fu v. INS, 386 F.2d 750, 753 (2d Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 1003 (1968)).
57. See generally Corado v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 945, 947 (8th Cir. 2004)
(finding that a single incident of persecution is not outside of the legal definition
of “persecution” for asylum claims).
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should examine multiple instances of harm cumulatively.58
Persecution does not require that the harm result in permanent
or serious injuries,59 and may include emotional or psychological
harm, as opposed to physical harm.60 At the same time, the harm
must “rise above unpleasantness, harassment, and even basic
suffering.”61 Additionally, persecution does not include mere
discrimination.62 While many of the BIA’s past cases “involved
actors who had a subjective intent to punish their victims . . .
this subjective ‘punitive’ or ‘malignant’ intent is not required for
harm to constitute persecution.”63
In some respects, the forms of harm that constitute
persecution are obvious. For example, in Gomes v. Gonzales, the
Seventh
Circuit
found
persecution
where
Muslim
fundamentalists harmed Catholics in Bangladesh by severely
beating them, threatening them with knives, and murdering
their Catholic relatives.64 Severe forms of often gender-based
harm such as rape,65 female genital mutilation (“FGM”),66 and
forced marriage similarly constitute persecution.67
Unlike “particular social group,” Congress has also stepped
in to broaden the definition of “persecution.” In 1996 Congress
modified the definition of “refugee” to include:
[A] person who has been forced to abort a pregnancy or
to undergo involuntary sterilization, or who has
been persecuted for failure or refusal to undergo such a
procedure or for other resistance to a coercive population

58. See, e.g., Haider v. Holder, 595 F.3d 276, 286 (6th Cir. 2010).
59. See Matter of O-Z- & I-Z-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 23, 25–26 (B.I.A. 1998).
60. See Mashiri v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 1112, 1120–21 (9th Cir. 2004).
61. Jorgi v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 53, 57 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting Nelson v.
INS, 232 F. 3d 258, 263 (1st Cir. 2000)).
62. Matter of A-M-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 737, 739–40 (B.I.A. 2005).
63. Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365 (B.I.A. 1996) (citing Matter
of Kulle, 19 I. & N. Dec. 318 (B.I.A. 1985); Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at
222–23.
64. See Gomes v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 746, 752–57 (7th Cir. 2007).
65. See Lopez-Galarza v. INS., 99 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[R]ape and
physical abuse at the hands of Sandinista military officers, coupled with her
imprisonment, food deprivation, and forced labor, satisfies the definition of
‘persecution.’”).
66. Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 365; Hassan v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d
513, 517–518 (8th Cir. 2007).
67. See, e.g., Al-Ghorbani v. Holder, 585 F.3d 980, 996 (6th Cir. 2009)
(recognizing that the right to marry is fundamental and persecution in the form
of forced marriage may lead to the formation of a valid particular social group).
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control program, shall be deemed to have
been persecuted on account of a political opinion, and a
person who has a well-founded fear that he or she will be
forced to undergo such a procedure or [be] subject
to persecution for such failure, refusal, or resistance
shall be deemed to have a well-founded fear
of persecution on account of political opinion.68

Congress therefore recognizes the existence of gender-specific
persecution, at least in the context of forced sterilization and
abortion.
While death threats and severe physical violence rise above
the level of harassment or discrimination, other forms of
persecution remain subject to reinterpretation and conflicting
case law. For example, Matter of Acosta established that
economic deprivation in some cases may be persecution but left
open the question of when deprivation is “severe” enough to rise
above generally “harsh conditions.”69 In an effort to clarify its
understanding of economic persecution, in Matter of T-Z-, the
BIA elaborated that the deprivation must be the “deliberate
imposition of severe economic disadvantage or the deprivation of
liberty, food, housing, employment, or other essentials of life,”70
but the resulting economic difficulties must be “above and
beyond” those shared by others in the country.71 Yet, what
specific facts illustrate a sufficiently severe deprivation is
unclear. Practitioners representing unaccompanied minors may
wish to use economic deprivation as a basis for persecution, but
will need alternative sources to advance a compelling
interpretation.72
Other forms of persecution relevant to the United States’
current refugee crisis may also require novel interpretations.
68. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42), revised under the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
69. See Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 222 (citing Cheng Kai Fu v. INS,
386 F.2d 750, 753 (2d Cir. 1967) (citations omitted)).
70. See Matter of T-Z-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 163, 163 (B.I.A. 2007).
71. See id. at 170–74.
72. See, e.g., Brief of Kids in Need of Defense as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Respondent, Feb. 20, 2015, Matter of Z-T-, __ I & N ___ (BIA 2015),
https://supportkind.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04
/KIND_Amicus_Brief_Feb_2015-1.pdf (discussing the severe economic
deprivation a child would endure if sent back to Honduras); see generally
Jonathan L. Falkler, Economic Mistreatment as Persecution in Asylum Claims:
Towards a Consistent Standard, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL FORUM 471 (2007)
(describing the standards for economic deprivation under asylum law).
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Practitioners may be able to persuade adjudicators that forms of
harm such as forced gang recruitment, domestic violence, child
abuse, and child abandonment amount to persecution in certain
cases. Arriving at these interpretations, however, will require
resorting to authority beyond current U.S. case law.
International human rights law offers one way of buttressing
novel interpretations of the refugee definition.
II. INCORPORATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO
UNITED STATES DOMESTIC LAW
United States courts must respect international law that
has a binding effect on the United States. Unfortunately,
however, the United States is bound only to those international
human rights treaties that are self-executing or are incorporated
into domestic law through ratification by the Senate. As such,
most sources of international human rights law are persuasive
authority only.73 According to scholar David Cole:
[I]nternational human rights feel aspirational, without
the force of law. It is not surprising then, that
international human rights arguments are rarely
advanced in domestic U.S. courts—in immigration cases
or elsewhere. Nor should it be surprising that in those
few instances where such arguments are broached, they
are as often as not ignored or summarily dismissed.74
Generally, United States judges are reluctant to cite to
international law, and international human rights law in
particular. Indeed, the late Justice Scalia once referred to
international human rights law as a “brooding omnipresence in
the sky.”75 As judges are already averse to relying on
international law in their opinions, they may grow tired of
73. Cf. El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseung, 525 U.S. 155, 176
(1999) (quoting Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 389, 404 (1985)) (“The ‘opinions of
our sister signatories’ . . . are ‘entitled to considerable weight.’”); INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 438–40 (1987) (recognizing the value of the
UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status
in interpreting the definition of “refugee”).
74. David Cole, The Idea of Humanity: Human rights and Immigrants’
Rights, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 627, 629 (2006).
75. William S. Dodge, Justice Scalia on Foreign Law and the Constitution,
OPINIO JURIS (Feb. 22, 2006), http://opiniojuris.org/2006/02/22/justice-scalia-onforeign-law-and-the-constitution/.
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frequent citations to international human rights treaties and
foreign sources if practitioners use them carelessly. With these
caveats in mind, attorneys may use treaties, along with other
interpretive sources available from United Nations’ bodies,
NGOs, and foreign immigration authorities, to advance
international human rights arguments in United States
jurisdictions.
Countries incorporate international law into their domestic
law in a variety of ways. Scholars define the way countries view
treaties vis-à-vis national law under one of two main concepts:
monism or dualism. In a simplistic monist state, international
law is automatically incorporated into domestic law.76
Importantly, the legislature, executive, and judicial branches of
a monist state are obligated to give effect to international law
over domestic law in cases of conflict.77 In comparison, in a
simplistic dualist state, international law and domestic law
remain two separate authorities that “govern different actors
and issues.”78 Unlike monist states, dualist states selectively
choose whether and how specific instruments of international
law will be incorporated into domestic law.79 In reality, states
tend to fall along a spectrum of monist and dualist policies, as
opposed to simply accepting a form of pure monism or dualism.80
The United States is no exception. Article VI of the United
States Constitution states that both “the Laws of the United
States” and treaties shall be “supreme Law of the Land.”81
Additionally, the Supreme Court has acknowledged the
importance of adherence to international law. Under The
Charming Betsy doctrine, a canon of statutory interpretation
derived from an early Supreme Court case, domestic law is to be
interpreted to avoid conflicts with international law.82 Ralph G.
Steinhardt argues that The Charming Betsy doctrine is a

76. See JEFFREY DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS, ACTORS,
243–44 (3d ed. 2010).
77. See id. at 245 (stating that the Netherlands is an example of a monist
state). See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD 17
(1986) (“[W]hen someone in Holland feels his human rights are being violated
he can to a Dutch judge and the judge must apply the law of the convention. He
must apply international law even if it is not in conformity with Dutch law.”).
78. DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 76, at 244.
79. Id.
80. See id.
81. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
82. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 66–69 (1804).
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reflection of the appreciation of monist values in United States
jurisprudence.83
Treaty interpretation in the United States has been
influenced by both monism and dualism.84 The Supreme Court
has recognized self-executing treaties—treaties that do not
require implementation by Congress into domestic law—as
binding where the treaty is unambiguous and requires only
judicial implementation.85 The incorporation of self-executing
treaties into domestic law is a reflection of the monist view of
international law at work in the United States legal system. For
example, the Supreme Court in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Franklin Mint Corporation concluded that the Warsaw
Convention, an international air carriage treaty that sets a limit
on an air carrier’s liability for lost cargo, is a self-executing
treaty.86 But treaties can also be non-self-executing, requiring
Congress to implement the terms of the treaty by statute. As
such, treaties fall along a spectrum of dualist (non-self-executing
treaties) and monist (self-executing treaties) approaches to
international law. United States diplomats negotiate human
rights treaties as non-self-executing, requiring legislative
adoption of the treaty into domestic law for the treaty to gain
binding effect.87 Courts are reluctant to read self-executing
language into these human rights treaties.88 Even if the Senate
ratifies a human rights treaty, the United States typically
83. Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of International Law as a Canon of
Domestic Statutory Construction, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1103, 1129 (1990) (“The
monist view of international law in domestic courts similarly denies that
international conduct or emerging norms of law can be relevant only if
recognized and adopted by Congress.”).
84. See Melissa A. Waters, Creeping Monism: The Judicial Trend Toward
Interpretive Incorporation of Human Rights Treaties, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 628,
638–39 (2007).
85. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829); see also United States v.
Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 667 (1992) (“[I]f, as respondent asserts, [the
treaty] is self-executing, it would appear that a court must enforce it on behalf
of an individual . . . .”).
86. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252
(1984) (“[T]he Convention is a self-executing treaty. Though the Convention
permits individual signatories to convert liability limits into national currencies
by legislation or otherwise, no domestic legislation is required to give the
Convention the force of law in the United States.”).
87. Waters, supra note 84, at 639.
88. See, e.g. White v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 432, 440 n.2 (finding the language
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention
Against Torture did not permit a reading of the treaties as self-executing); Sei
Fujii v. California, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 721–25 (1952) (holding that the U.N. Charter
was not self-executing).
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includes enough reservations to prevent the treaty from
“altering domestic law.”89 For example, Attorney General John
Ashcroft made it explicitly clear that the Refugee Convention
and the 1967 Protocol are not self-executing treaties and
therefore do not have the force of law.90 The BIA has also held
that only the provisions of the 1967 Protocol and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights incorporated into domestic law by
statute are binding in United States immigration proceedings.91
In short, practitioners must understand the relative authority of
international human rights treaties in United States domestic
law and be careful not to overstate the binding authority of
international law.
III.

SOURCES AND INTERPRETATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW

Human rights treaties and their interpretations can be used
to buttress asylum claims. As discussed in Part II, courts are
unlikely to cite to international human rights law in support of
a decision. Treaties, U.N. reports, and foreign authorities can,
however, demonstrate to an adjudicator the prominence and
viability of a particular interpretation of the refugee definition
and help persuade a court to rule in favor of an asylum applicant.
This section analyzes various instruments of international law
and provides examples as to which of these or similar
instruments have been recognized by federal courts, the BIA,
and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agencies.
A. UNHCR INTERPRETATIONS OF THE REFUGEE
CONVENTION
UNHCR guidelines are among the most practical sources
that practitioners can cite when interpreting the 1980 Refugee
Act. As the UNHCR is the United Nations administrative body
for the Refugee Convention, adjudicators tend to defer more
readily to its interpretations. Article 35 of the Refugee
Convention requires contracting states “to cooperate with the

89. David Sloss, The Domestication of International Human Rights: NonSelf-Executing Declarations and Human Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J. INT’L L.
129, 172 (1999).
90. Matter of D-J-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 584 n.8.
91. Matter of A-G-, 19 I. & N. Dec. 502, 507–08 (B.I.A. 1987).
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Office of the [UNHCR], or any other agency of the United
Nations which may succeed it, in the exercise of its functions,
and shall in particular facilitate its duty of supervising the
application of the provisions of this Convention.”92 Article 35 of
the Refugee Convention, however, has not been incorporated
into domestic law and therefore the United States is not bound
by UNHCR interpretations of the Refugee Convention..
Regardless, UNHCR materials remain a great source of
interpretative guidance.
The UNHCR publishes two types of materials—a handbook
and various guidelines—each of which interpret provisions of
the Refugee Convention. It is important to remember, however,
that UNHCR guidelines are merely persuasive authority and
their interpretations are therefore not binding on the United
States. As the Supreme Court stated in INS v. Cardoza-Fonesca:
We do not suggest, of course, that the explanation in the
U.N. Handbook has the force of law or in any way binds
the [United States] with reference to the asylum
provisions of § 208(a) . . . . Nonetheless, the Handbook
[and Guidelines] provide[] significant guidance in
construing the Protocol, to which Congress sought to
conform.93
The BIA, IJs, USCIS, and appellate courts use the UNHCR
Handbook and guidelines to interpret the 1980 Refugee Act.94
The United States Supreme Court has used the UNHCR
Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee
Status in interpreting the definition of “refugee.”95 In INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, the Supreme Court cited the UNHCR
Handbook to adopt a broad definition of “well-founded fear” that
92. Refugee Convention art. 35, supra note 6.
93. INS v. Cardoza-Fonesca, 480 U.S. 421, 439 n.22 (1987).
94. See, e.g., Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 586 (referring to the 2002
Guidelines of the UNHCR to mandate the requirement of social visibility);
Matter of C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 960 (B.I.A. 2006) (“The recent Guidelines
issued by the United Nations confirm that ‘visibility’ is an important element
in identifying the existence of a particular social group.”); Asylum Officer Basic
Training, Female Asylum Applicants and Gender-Related Claims, U.S.
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS. (Mar. 12, 2009), https://www.uscis.gov
/sites/default/files/USCIS/Humanitarian/Refugees%20%26%20Asylum/Asylum
/AOBTC%20Lesson%20Plans/Female-Asylum-Applicants-Gender-RelatedClaims-31aug10.pdf (citing UNHCR gender-based claims “[r]ecognizing the
particular vulnerability of women”).
95. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 438–39.
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benefited the applicant. In Mohammed v. Gonzales, the Ninth
Circuit quoted the 2002 UNHCR’s Guidelines on International
Protection: Membership of a Particular Social Group, noting that
“women may constitute a particular social group under certain
circumstances based on the common characteristic of sex,
whether or not they associate with one another based on that
shared characteristic.”96 Similarly, USCIS training materials
defer substantially to UNHCR interpretations in determining
how to analyze gender-based asylum claims.97
Yet the BIA has not always adhered faithfully to UNHCR
interpretations, even when using UNHCR materials as
persuasive authority. In Matter of S-E-G-, the BIA cited the
UNHCR’s Guidelines on International Protection: Membership of
a Particular Social Group in justifying its adoption of the “social
visibility” requirement.98 Scholars have suggested that this
interpretation of the UNHCR Guidelines obscures the UNHCR’s
original intention to create alternative “immutability” and
“social visibility” tests, as opposed to one test possessing both
requirements.99 In Matter of Thomas, the UNHCR filed an
amicus brief in opposition to “social visibility,” claiming that
“[t]he UNHCR would caution the board against adopting such a
rigid approach which may disregard groups that the Convention
is designed to protect.”100 The BIA’s interpretation of “social
visibility” shows that the BIA considers the UNHCR Handbook
persuasive, but does not automatically adopt the UNHCR’s
interpretation of the handbook. The risk of unfavorable
precedent, however, should not dissuade practitioners from
using the UNHCR guidelines in support of their arguments.

96. Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 798 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting
UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection: Membership of a Particular
Social Group, at 4, U.N. Doc. (HCR/GIP/02/02, (May 7, 2002)).
97. See Female Asylum Applicants and Gender-Related Claims, supra note
94.
98. Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 586. Since S-E-G-, the BIA has
replaced “social visibility” with “social distinction.” See generally Matter of ME-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 236.
99. See Fatma E. Marouf, The Emerging Importance of “Social Visibility”
in Defining a “Particular Social Group” and Its Potential Impact on Asylum
Claims Related to Sexual Orientation, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 47, 70–71 (2008)
(comparing the BIA’s “social visibility” interpretation to the UNHCR
Guidelines); see also Casper, supra note 48, at 1–2, 19–22.
100. Brief of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees as Amici Curiae at 10, Matter of Thomas, No. A75-597-033 (2007),
http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/45c34c244.pdf.
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When arguing gender-based asylum claims, practitioners
should consider citing to the UNHCR’s Guidelines on
International Protection: Gender-Related Persecution.101 These
guidelines are helpful in cases involving domestic violence, rape,
sexual violence, or other gender-based persecution. Paragraph
nine is particularly germane:
While female and male applicants may be subjected to
the same forms of harm, they may also face forms of
persecution specific to their sex. International human
rights law and international criminal law clearly identify
certain acts as violations of these laws, such as sexual
violence, and support their characterization as serious
abuses, amounting to persecution. In this sense,
international law can assist decision-makers to
determine the persecutory nature of a particular act.
There is no doubt that rape and other forms of genderrelated violence, such as dowry-related violence, female
genital mutilation, domestic violence, and trafficking,
are acts which inflict severe pain and suffering – both
mental and physical – and which have been used as
forms of persecution, whether perpetrated by State or
private actors.102
This paragraph supports the argument that adjudicators must
look to international law when identifying whether or not
gender-based violence is persecutory. Following paragraph nine,
the guidelines proceed to analyze specific common incidents of
gender-based persecution and particular social groups (e.g.
prostitutes and homosexuals).103
The guidelines further suggest that, in addition to
particular social group arguments, practitioners should evaluate
potential political opinion arguments in gender-based asylum
claims.104 The UNHCR acknowledges that “[t]he image of a
political refugee as someone who is fleeing persecution for his or
her direct involvement in political activity does not always
correspond to the reality of the experiences of women in some

101. See UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection: Gender-Related
Persecution, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/02/01, (May 7, 2002).
102. Id. at 3.
103. Id. at 3–11.
104. Id. at 8–9.
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societies.”105 Persecutors may impute women with the “political
opinions of their family or male relatives.”106 Women may also
engage in political activity by refusing “to engage in certain
activities, such as providing meals to government soldiers.”107 In
many circumstances, an imputed political opinion claim may be
more applicable than a claim based on a gender-oriented
particular social group. Of course, in other circumstances, an
applicant may be able to establish a more direct political opinion
through overt feminist activism.108
For practitioners representing children in asylum claims,
the UNHCR has also published Guidelines on International
Protection: Child Asylum Claims. In these guidelines, the
UNHCR encourages “[a] child-sensitive application of the
refugee definition,” as would be consistent with the 1989
Convention on the Rights of Child (“CRC”).109 The UNHCR
indicates that the CRC requires adjudicators to consider the
“best interests of the child as a primary consideration in all
actions concerning children.”110 As discussed below in Section
B(ii), the CRC has not been ratified by the United States. As
such, when citing to these guidelines, practitioners should be
careful that the suggested interpretation is not dependent on the
CRC. Regardless, practitioners may find these guidelines helpful
in framing arguments for asylum claims regarding underage
recruitment, child trafficking and labor, female genital
mutilation, domestic violence, and other child-specific forms of
persecution. In particular, these guidelines may be useful in
suggesting that any of these acts constitute persecution.

105. Id. at 8.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1241–42 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[I]f a
woman’s opposition to the Iranian laws in question is so profound that she
would choose to suffer the severe consequences of noncompliance, her beliefs
may well be characterized as ‘so fundamental to [her] identity or conscience that
[they] ought not be required to be changed.’ (citing Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N.
Dec. at. 234)).
109. UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection: Child Asylum Claims,
at 4, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/09/08, (Dec. 22, 2009).
110. Id.
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B. TREATIES
Most human rights treaties are not self-executing and have
not been incorporated into domestic law. There is a plethora of
human rights treaties that, though not binding, can still be used
as persuasive authority in domestic violence-based asylum
claims and asylum claims involving children. This section will
discuss three such treaties: the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”); the
Convention on the Rights of the Child; and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”).
1. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women was signed by the United States
on July 17, 1980, but has not been ratified.111 It is the leading
international covenant addressing gender-based human rights
violations. Article 1 defines discrimination against women very
broadly as
[A]ny distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the
basis of sex, which has the effect or purpose of impairing
or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by
women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of
equality of men and women, of human rights and
fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social,
cultural, civil or any other field.112
CEDAW also established the Committee on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW
Committee”)
to
provide
interpretive
guidance
and
recommendations.113 Numerous provisions of CEDAW grant
expansive protection to women, and the CEDAW Committee’s

111. See Luisa Blanchfield, The U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW): Issues in the U.S.
Ratification Debate, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, at 1 (June 28, 2011),
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40750.pdf.
112. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, art. 1, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981)
[hereinafter CEDAW].
113. Id. arts. 17, 21.
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interpretations of these provisions may be relevant to genderbased asylum claims.114 The CEDAW Committee’s General
Recommendations No. 32 and No. 14 provide the most relevant
and specific support for domestic violence-based asylum claims.
General Recommendation No. 32—”the gender related
dimensions of refugee status, asylum, nationality, and stateless
women”—published in November of 2014, specifically addresses
gender-based asylum claims.115. The CEDAW Committee makes
clear that one of the purposes of General Recommendation No.
32 is to provide guidance to states on how to address gender
discrimination in order to fulfill the rights of asylum-seeking
women.116 The Committee also states that it intends for its
interpretation to fit within the existing international law
framework, comprised of other treaties that relate to asylumseeking women, including the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the Refugee Convention.117 This Recommendation
contains two particularly useful provisions.
The first is from General Recommendation No. 32 is
paragraph 15, where the CEDAW Committee states that
“gender-related forms of persecution” may include:
[T]he threat of female genital mutilation, forced/early
marriage, threat of violence and/or so-called “honour
crimes,” trafficking in women, acid attacks, rape and
other forms of sexual assault, serious forms of domestic
violence, the imposition of the death penalty or other
physical punishments existing in discriminatory justice
systems, forced sterilization, political or religious
114. See id. arts. 2, 3, 5, 9; see also Comm. on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women, General Recommendation No. 12: Violence
against Women, U.N. Doc. A/44/38 (1989), http://www.un.org/womenwatch
/daw/cedaw/recommendations/recomm.htm#recom12 (declaring that States
must protect women from “violence of any kind occurring within the
family. . . or in any other area of social life”); Comm. on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women, General Recommendation No. 19: Violence
against Women, para. 1, U.N. Doc. A/47/38 (1992), http://www.un.org/women
watch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/recomm.htm#recom19
(“Gender-based
violence is a form of discrimination that seriously inhibits women’s ability to
enjoy rights and freedoms on a basis of equality with men.”).
115. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General
Recommendation No. 32: On the Gender-Related Dimensions of Refugee Status,
Asylum, Nationality, and Stateless Women, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/GC/32 (Nov.
14, 2014), https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N14/627/90/PDF
/N1462790.pdf?OpenElement.
116. Id. at para. 4.
117. Id. at paras. 5, 9.
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persecution for holding feminist or other views and the
persecutory consequences of failing to conform to genderprescribed social norms and mores, or for claiming their
rights under the Convention.118
Practitioners may cite to paragraph 15 to support the assertion
that these various forms of domestic violence constitute
“persecution” for purposes of the Refugee Convention and are
thus a valid and recognized basis for asylum.
Additionally, in paragraph 13, the CEDAW Committee
states that the purpose of Recommendation No. 32 is to ensure
the application of “a gender perspective when interpreting all
five grounds [for asylum], and [the] use [of] gender as a factor in
recognizing membership in a particular social group. . . .”119
Practitioners can use this statement to bolster the argument
that asylum claims founded on gender-based domestic violence
satisfy the “immutability” requirement for particular social
group claims, because gender is an immutable characteristic.120
Paragraph 13 also encourages adjudicators to take a genderbased perspective with all asylum claims, not only for “particular
social group” claims. A practitioner might cite to this paragraph
when explaining how an asylum claim that does not appear to
be related to gender is gender-based. For example, the asylum
claim of a female who has been targeted by Salvadoran gangs
may be dismissed by an adjudicator as a gang-related claim,
which has been held, on its own, to not qualify as a ground for
asylum. However, explaining that there is a gendered
component to the targeting of females in Salvadoran gang
culture, as opposed to in male recruitment cases, could support
a particular social group or political opinion claim.
Another useful General Recommendation from the CEDAW
Committee is General Recommendation No. 14.121 This
Recommendation addresses female genital mutilation.122
118. Id. at para. 15
119. Id. at para. 13.
120. See Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. at 392–94 (holding that an applicant
for asylum seeking relief based on membership in a particular social group must
establish that the group is “(1) composed of members who share a common
immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially distinct
within the society in question).
121. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General
Recommendation No. 14: Female Circumcision, U.N. Doc. A/45/38 and
Corrigendum (1990), http://www.refworld.org/docid/453882a30.html.
122. Id.
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Though Recommendation No. 14 does not explicitly say that
FGM is persecution,123 it has been cited in both federal court and
BIA cases in support of this conclusion. In Abay v. Ashcroft, the
Sixth Circuit cited General Recommendation No. 14 to support
the conclusion that FGM is a recognized violation of women’s
and female children’s rights, and constitutes persecution.124
Recommendation No. 14 was also referenced in Abankwah v.
INS, again as evidence that FGM is an internationally
recognized crime rising to the level of persecution.125
More generally, evidence that practitioners have
successfully cited to General Recommendations indicates a
willingness on the part of federal courts and the BIA to consider
non-binding international law when deciding various claims.
The CEDAW Committee’s General Recommendations No. 32
and No. 14 themselves provide support for establishing that
various forms of domestic violence rise to the level of
persecution, that gender may be used to satisfy the immutability
requirement in PSG claims, and that FGM is persecution. In
addition to the Recommendations discussed here, CEDAW and
other CEDAW Committee materials may also support general
claims about the prevalence of gender-related domestic violence,
and how it affects asylum seekers.126
2. The Convention on the Rights of the Child
The Convention on the Rights of the Child recognizes and
grants broad protection to children’s fundamental rights.127
With 140 signatories, the CRC is the most widely ratified treaty
in history.128 The United States signed the CRC on February 16,
123. Id. The text of General Recommendation No. 14 recognizes that “the
practice of female circumcision and other traditional practices [that are]
harmful to the health of women” and recommends various methods by which
States can combat FGM and other harmful practices.
124. Abay v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634, 638 (6th Cir. 2004).
125. Abankwah v. INS, 185 F.3d 18, 23 (2d Cir. 1999).
126. Though a comprehensive list of such resources is beyond the scope of
this article, the Committee’s website offers numerous resources, including
annual reports and general recommendations. See UNHCR, Comm. on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, http://www.ohchr.org/en
/hrbodies/cedaw/pages/cedawindex.aspx
127. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3,
http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx [hereinafter CRC].
128. UNICEF and the CRC, Convention on the Rights of the Child, A World
of Difference: 25 CRC Achievements, UNICEF (last updated June 18, 2014),
http://www.unicef.org/crc/index_73549.html.
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1995, but has not ratified it and the United States Supreme
Court explicitly rejected the theory that the pervasive
ratification of the CRC elevated the treaty to a manifestation of
customary international law.129
Though the CRC has gained unprecedented global
acceptance, this treaty remains non-binding on the United
States. However, it remains persuasive authority for United
States courts, the BIA, and asylum officers. There are many
ways that the CRC can be used to support children’s asylum
claims, including the use of Articles 12 and 22. Under United
States law, children often receive refugee or asylee status as
derivatives of a parent’s application.130 The CRC, however,
recognizes that children are independent individuals that are
entitled to rights and protections separate from their parents.131
Article 12 requires that parties allow a child who is capable of
forming his or her own views and respect the right of the child
to express those views freely in all matters affecting that
child.132 Article 22 represents an important provision in the
context of an asylum claim for a child, stating:
States Parties shall take appropriate measures to ensure
that a child who is seeking refugee status or who is
considered a refugee in accordance with applicable
international or domestic law and procedures shall,
whether unaccompanied or accompanied by his or her
parents or by any other person, receive appropriate
protection and humanitarian assistance in the
enjoyment of applicable rights set forth in the present
Convention and in other international human rights or
humanitarian instruments to which the said States are
Parties.133
Thus, the CRC broadly recognizes that children are
independently entitled to rights and protections, and specifically
points out that this entitlement extends to the right to
independently apply for asylum.

129. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 621–23 (2005) (stating that the
failure of the United States to ratify the CRC indicates a lack of national
consensus on the issue).
130. See INA, § 208(b)(2); 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3) (2014).
131. CRC, supra note 127, art. 12.
132. Id.
133. Id. art. 22.
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Some provisions in the CRC may be helpful in making
arguments regarding the definition of “persecution” as it relates
to children. Article 36 broadly requires that state parties
“protect the child against all other forms of exploitation
prejudicial to any aspects of the child’s welfare.”134 Article 37
states that children should be protected from “torture” and
“cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.”135 There is additional
support in the CRC that recruitment of children by armed
groups constitutes “persecution.”136 Article 38 requires states to
ensure that children younger than fifteen “do not take a direct
part in hostilities.”137 These provisions suggest that the
recruitment of children to take part in armed violence as well as
the torture or exploitation of children by armed groups may
qualify as “persecution.”
Other provisions of the CRC support the assertion that
children, who among themselves have a shared experience,
constitute a “particular social group.” The CRC supports this
assertion by advocating for the notion that children are
independent legal agents entitled to their own rights and
protections. The independent rights of children, for example, are
recognized by Articles 12 and 22. In addition, many CRC
provisions demonstrate the distinct right of children to seek
rights and protection under the law.138 Recognizing children as
independent and autonomous beings entitled to rights and
protections supports the argument that children are socially
distinct. This, in turn, reemphasizes that children constitute a
“particular social group.” One can argue, therefore, that children
recruited by armed groups would qualify as refugees under the
“particular social group” category based on their age at the time
of recruitment and their shared experiences of abduction,
torture, and escape.

134. Id. art. 36.
135. Id. art. 37.
136. Id. art. 38.
137. Id.
138. See, e.g., id. art. 3 (“In all actions concerning children. . . the best
interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.”); id. art. 8 (“States
Parties undertake to respect the right of the child to preserve his or her identity,
including nationality. . . .”); id. art.12 (“States Parties shall assure to the child
who is capable of forming his or her own views the right to express those views
freely in all matters affecting the child. . . .”); id. art. 24 (“States Parties
recognize the right of the child to the enjoyment of the highest attainable
standard of health. . . .”); id. art. 28 (“States Parties recognize the right of the
child to education. . . .”).
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3. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is
a broad human rights treaty signed and ratified by the United
States.139 As a result, the ICCPR might provide strong support
for asylum claims. In reality, however, it is only binding to the
extent that Congress incorporates it into domestic law.140 In
practice, the ICCPR has not proven to be influential or useful in
most asylum claims.141 Nonetheless, there are a number of
relevant and useful provisions in this treaty that should not be
overlooked, specifically those provisions that assist in
interpreting “particular social group” or “persecution.”
The ICCPR includes a number of general provisions useful
in interpreting the definition of “particular social group.” Article
2 requires that states respect individuals of any “race, colour,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, property, birth or other status.”142 While the
refugee definition in United States law explicitly protects many
of these groups, others—such as property status or sex—are not
included in the definition. Practitioners can use Article 2 to
suggest that the “particular social group” category is intended to
protect these other groups. Article 3, which requires that states
“undertake to ensure the equal right of men and women” further
supports construing “particular social group” to include sex.143
Article 24 of the ICCPR explicitly protects children, suggesting
that they too may be a protected “particular social group.”144
Furthermore, practitioners can utilize the ICCPR to
construe “persecution.” Among other things, the ICCPR
prohibits depriving an individual of life,145 torture or “cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,”146 slavery,147
139. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S.
Exec. Rep. 102–23, 999 U.N.T.S. 171[hereinafter ICCPR].
140. Cf. Sloss, supra note 89, at 171–72.
141. DANIEL WILSHER, IMMIGRANT DETENTION: LAW, HISTORY, AND
POLITICS 166 (2012) (noting that the ICCPR has a lack of influence on detention
practices in the U.S., most of Europe, and Australia) (“[R]epresents an
unusually clear failure of the international human rights system as a tool of
legal and political change.”).
142. ICCPR, supra note 139, art. 2(1).
143. Id. art. 3.
144. Id. art. 24.
145. Id. art. 6.
146. Id. art. 7.
147. Id. art. 8.

174

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 26:1

arbitrary arrest or detention,148 and restricting freedom of
thought, conscience, and religion.149 Article 23 is particularly
pertinent in gender-based and domestic violence claims,
requiring “free and full consent” of individuals seeking to
marry.150 Forced marriage may therefore qualify as persecution.
Additionally, Article 23(4) states that parties must “take
appropriate steps to ensure equality of rights and
responsibilities of spouses.”151 Practitioners may use this
provision to suggest domestic violence is persecution, especially
when the government is unwilling to intervene or pass laws
criminalizing domestic violence.
C. U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS—THE
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Arguably, the single most influential U.N. General
Assembly Resolution is the Universal Declaration on Human
Rights (“UDHR”).152 The U.N. General Assembly adopted the
UDHR on December 10, 1948 as a non-binding resolution, laying
out the basic human rights to which all individuals are
entitled.153 Since its adoption, the UDHR has gained prominence
as the fundamental international instrument on basic human
rights.154
The UDHR gave rise to several human rights treaties,
including the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”).155 In addition, the Preamble to the
Refugee Convention specifically references the UDHR.156 Many
148. Id. art. 9.
149. Id. art. 18; see id. art. 19, 22, 25.
150. Id. art. 23.
151. Id. art. 23(4).
152. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
153. See DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 76, at 410–11.
154. Id. at 416 (“After the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration is often
considered to be the most influential international instrument of the twentieth
century.”).
155. Id. at 410 (“[G]overnments intended the Universal Declaration to serve
principally as an intermediate step toward the preparation of a binding
international human rights treaty, delays in the preparation of the two
subsequent International Covenants left the Universal Declaration for many
years as the primary and most heavily invoked international human rights
instrument.”).
156. Refugee Convention, supra note 6 (referencing the UDHR in the
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scholars believe that the UDHR has been so influential, and has
been cited and utilized so often by both international and
domestic law, that it has been partially elevated and
transformed into binding customary international law.157
The United States was a major proponent of the UDHR and
voted for its adoption in the General Assembly in 1948.158 Since
its adoption, United States courts have cited to the UDHR
extensively,159 including in an array of asylum cases.160 When
compared with other international instruments, the UDHR has
been referenced—and even relied on—more than most, if not all,
other international sources.161 Despite the influential role the
UDHR has played in United States case law, the BIA has held
that in asylum cases, the provisions of the UDHR are only
binding if they have been specifically adopted into United States
law.162 Nevertheless, due to its exalted status in international
law and the extensive reference to the UDHR in United States
case law, adjudicators of asylum cases may be more open to
UDHR-supported arguments. Specifically, its provisions may be
cited as interpretive support in defining “particular social group”
and “persecution” within the context of domestic violence-based
asylum claims.
Article 2 grants “all of the rights and freedom set forth in
[the] Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as

beginning of the Preamble).
157. See DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 76, at 416 (“The UDHR has been cited
with approval in countless successor treaties, declarations, and resolutions by
the United Nations and regional organizations, and many of its provisions have
been incorporated into the constitutions and laws of individual states. At least
some of its provisions are now part of customary international law.”).
158. See Tai-Heng Cheng, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights at
Sixty: Is It Still Right for the United States?, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 251, 254
(2008).
159. See id. at 272 (explaining that the author found 238 reported federal
and state cases from 1948 to October 1, 2007, that referred to the Universal
Declaration).
160. See, e.g., Zheng v. Gonzales, 192 Fed. App’x 733 (10th Cir. 2006);
Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463 (3d Cir. 2003).
161. See Cheng, supra note 158, at 288 (pointing out that though the UDHR
has had “marginal impact on U.S. law”, this instrument has had influence over
certain areas of the law that “is therefore not an achievement critics should
belittle or ignore.”).
162. Matter of A-G-, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 508. It is also important to note that
some commentators and judges have interpreted the Supreme Court case, Sosa
v. Alvarez-Machain, as holding that the UDHR is not a binding source of
international law. See Cheng, supra note 158, at 274.
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. . . sex” to everyone.163 Article 14 of the UDHR further provides
that individuals have a “right to seek and to enjoy in other
countries asylum from persecution.”164 Read together, these
provisions support the assertion that asylum adjudicators
should take a gender-based perspective when considering
asylum claims, especially particular social group and political
opinion claims.165 These provisions also support the argument
that sex should be protected under the “particular social group”
category within the refugee definition.166
The UDHR can also be used to help define “persecution.”
Like the ICCPR, the UDHR contains provisions that protect
basic human rights, which can be used to interpret the meaning
of “persecution.” Article 3 protects individuals’ right to “life,
liberty, and security of person.”167 Article 4 requires that no
individual be subjected to “slavery or servitude.”168 The right to
be free from torture and degrading treatment is protected by
Article 5,169 while a person’s right to “leave any country,
including his [or her] own . . . .” is granted by Article 13.170
Importantly for domestic-violence-based claims, Article 16
protects individuals’ right to marry, but also the right to consent
to marriage.171 All of these provisions of the UDHR—and more—
can be cited in support of the assertion that deprivation of these
rights constitutes “persecution” for the purposes of asylum.
D. SISTER SIGNATORIES’ INTERPRETATIONS OF THE REFUGEE
CONVENTION AND OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES
In addition to the interpretive tools discussed above, the
inclusion of foreign cases and interpretations of treaties can
support a specific interpretation of the refugee definition under
United States law.172 Practitioners can utilize foreign case law
163. UDHR, supra note 152, art. 2.
164. Id. art. 14.
165. See Female Asylum Applicants and Gender-Related Claims, supra note
94, at 16–17.
166. Id. at 27.
167. UDHR, supra note 152, art. 3.
168. Id. art. 4.
169. Id. art. 5.
170. Id. art. 13.
171. Id. art. 16.
172. See generally Fatma Marouf, The Role of Foreign Authorities in U.S.
Asylum Adjudication, 45 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 391 (2013) (analyzing the role
of foreign authorities in United States asylum adjudication). From a policy
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and agency manuals to show an interpretative pattern among
sister signatories. This is particularly true in cases where an
issue has been scarcely analyzed by United States adjudicators,
including various human rights issues. Practitioners must be
careful, however, to select only the most persuasive foreign
authorities. Use of foreign authorities by courts may result in
the adoption of the more restrictive or inappropriate asylum
policies of other nations by United States adjudicators.173 By
including international human rights arguments in asylum
claims, however, practitioners can facilitate the adoption of a
shared understanding of international human rights law by
those countries that are bound to follow it.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that when
interpreting a treaty, “the ‘opinions of our sister signatories’ . . .
are ‘entitled to considerable weight.’”174 In Lawrence v. Texas, for
example, the Supreme Court cited to the European Court of
Human Rights in deciding to overturn its decision in Bowers v.
Hardwick.175 Foreign case law has also been cited extensively in
cases concerning capital punishment. In Roper v. Simmons, the
Supreme Court acknowledged that “the Court has referred to the
laws of other countries and to international authorities as
instructive for its interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’”176 In particular,
the Court relied heavily on the experience of the United
Kingdom, suggesting that the “historic ties between our
countries” shed significant light on the issue.177 As such, it is not
unheard of or abnormal for adjudicators to look toward foreign
standpoint, Marouf contends that foreign authorities must be included in legal
arguments to encourage states to “[E]ngage in a productive dialogue and seek
to persuade one another about how to interpret various provisions of
[international human rights treaties].” Id. at 483–84. By including
international human rights arguments in asylum claims, practitioners can
facilitate the adoption of a shared understanding of international human rights
law by those countries that are bound to follow it.
173. See id. at 480–84.
174. Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 16 (2010) (citing El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd.
v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 176 (1999)).
175. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 560 (2003). In Bowers, the
Supreme Court held that a Georgia sodomy statute did not violate the
fundamental rights of homosexuals. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 1039
(1986). The European Court of Human Rights overturned a statute similar to
the one in Bowers, though it did not cite Bowers itself. See P.G. & J.H. v. United
Kingdom, 2001-IX Eur. Ct. H. R. 195, App. No. 00044787/98, para.56.
176. Roper, 543 U.S. at 575 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958))
(emphasis omitted).
177. Id. at 577.
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court interpretations of treaties or legal doctrine relevant to the
case at hand in interpreting United States domestic law.
Unfortunately, the BIA and federal courts only rarely defer
to foreign interpretations of the Refugee Convention or the 1967
Protocol in their adjudications.178 For example, in a concurring
opinion in Matter of Kasinga, Judge Rosenberg cited Canadian
case law to support her argument that gender-based asylum
claims are becoming internationally recognized.179 And in his
concurrence in Negusie v. Holder, Justice Stevens cited cases
from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom
to support his interpretation of the persecutor bar.180 These
cases suggest that some judges may find foreign authorities at
least mildly persuasive. Unfortunately, these cases represent an
exception, not the rule. Instead, these courts typically prefer
traditional rules and canons of statutory interpretation to the
Refugee Act, thereby “ignoring the incorporated treaty.”181
Immigration agencies within DHS—mainly USCIS and
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”)—may be more
likely to consider foreign authorities than the courts. Asylum
officers are trained to evaluate gender-based asylum claims
using international cases and guidelines published by countries
such as Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom.182 In its
Matter of L-R- brief, DHS cited to the Canadian Guidelines on
Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution
in support of recognizing asylum claims from domestic violencebased particular social groups.183 DHS’s and USCIS’s use of
foreign case law and agency sources suggests that immigration

178. Professor Marouf acknowledges that “[i]n very rare cases, U.S. Courts
of Appeals have mentioned foreign authority in analyzing the Refugee Act, but
such references are made in passing, often as a footnote, unhinged from the
principled approach to treaty interpretation.” Marouf, supra note 172, 418–19
(emphasis omitted).
179. Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 377.
180. Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1175 n.7 (2009) (citing Canada v.
Asghedom [2001] F.C.T. 972 (Can. Fed. Ct.); Gurung v. Secretary of State for
Home Dept., [200] UKAIT 4870 (U.K.Immigr.App.Trib.); SRYYY v. Minister for
Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs, [2005] 147 F.C.R. 1
(Austl.Fed.Ct.); Refugee Appeal No. 2142/94 (N.Z. Refugee Status App. Auth.,
Mar. 20, 1997)).
181. Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 393.
182. Female Asylum Applicants and Gender-Related Claims, supra note 94,
at 7–9.
183. Brief for Department of Homeland Security at 13 n.10, Matter of L-R(filed Apr. 13, 2009), http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/us/20090716asylum-brief.pdf.
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agencies under DHS are more likely to accept arguments based
on foreign case law than federal courts or IJs.
Practitioners should incorporate foreign authorities into
their international human rights arguments, but must do so
tactfully. As mentioned above, an increased offering of foreign
case law may cause United States Courts to further eschew
foreign authorities.184 Professors Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein
have proposed three factors to be considered when selecting
foreign authorities. First, the foreign authority must “reflect a
judgment based on that state’s private information about how
some question is best answered.”185 Second, the issue discussed
in the foreign authority must be similar to the problem before
the interpreting court.186 Third, the foreign authority must be an
“independent judgment,” and not merely the result of an
emerging jurisprudential trend.187
Professor Fatma Marouf provides an analysis of how these
criteria may be applied to foreign authorities interpreting the
Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol.188 First, the foreign
authority should offer something not available to United States
adjudicators, primarily that “the foreign state’s interpretation of
the Protocol should stem from the local knowledge provided by
actual asylum cases that have been decided by the state’s
government.”189 Second, the authority should “address a

184. See Stephen Meili, When Do Human Rights Treaties Help Asylum
Seekers? A Study of Theory and Practice in Canadian Jurisprudence Since 1990,
51 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 627, 656 (2014) (quoting telephone interview with C-6
(Jan. 5, 2012)) (discussing the use of human rights arguments in asylum cases:
“It’s always counterproductive to argue things that the court is not going to be
receptive to. I mean in the sense if that you are just irritating the decision
maker, in my experience that’s generally counterproductive, unless you are
setting up a record for appeal or you have some other strategy in mind.”);
Stephen Meili, U.K. Refugee Lawyers: Pushing the Boundaries of Domestic
Court Acceptance of International Human Rights Law, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1123,
1143 (2013) (discussing the use of treaty-based arguments: “[O]ne attorney
stated that lawyers who push such arguments at the Tribunal level, where—
according to this lawyer—the judges do not like complicated law, might end up
biasing the court against their client. Other lawyers noted, for example, that
‘[p]eople feel they have to throw everything in . . . I’ve sat at the back of the
courts lots of times and watched judges say ‘what does this add your argument?’
Why be put in that position?’”).
185. Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Other States, 59 STAN.
L. REV. 131, 144 (2006) (emphasis omitted).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. See Marouf, supra note 172, at 452–72.
189. Id. at 454.
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question similar to the one before the domestic court and share
a common general understanding of the concept involved.”190
Third, the foreign state must “exercise independent judgment in
its interpretation.”191 As such, practitioners should be wary of
European Union states with less developed asylum systems and
those states which blindly adopt UNHCR guidelines without
independent investigation.192 In addition to these three criteria,
Marouf suggests that the following six factors are important in
determining how much weight to accord foreign authorities:
(1) whether the foreign state is “specially affected”
by asylum applications;
(2) whether the foreign state has a well-developed
body of asylum law, through jurisprudence or
legislation;
(3) the persuasiveness of the foreign state’s
interpretation;
(4) the precedential value of the foreign authority;
(5) whether a given interpretation can be
consistently applied; and
(6) whether the interpretation reflects the human
rights principles underlying the treaty.193
As an example, United States practitioners could use Islam
v. Secretary of State for the Home Department in international
human rights arguments exploring foreign case law.194 In Islam,
the United Kingdom’s House of Lords granted asylum to a
Pakistani woman fleeing domestic violence. The House of Lords
began its discussion by explaining its interpretation of
“particular social group” using United States cases, most notably
Matter of Acosta.195 Citing Acosta, the court stated that a
common immutable characteristic “might be an innate one ‘such
as sex, color, or kinship ties.’”196 “This reasoning covers
Pakistani women because they are discriminated against and as

190. Id. at 457.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 457–58.
194. Islam v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [1999] 2 WLR
1015 (HL) (UK).
195. Id.
196. Id.
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a group they are unprotected by the state.”197 In addition, the
court suggested that it would have accepted a more narrow
group definition formulated by “[t]he unifying characteristics of
gender, suspicion of adultery, and lack of protection.”
Islam offers an example of a case that fits Marouf’s criteria.
The United Kingdom asylum system is robust, well-developed,
and uses the Acosta standard for particular social group
determinations.198 Since Islam cites United States law so heavily
it is more likely to persuade U.S. adjudicators because the case
is founded on law that is binding on U.S. adjudicators.
Furthermore, the United Kingdom has a large population of
refugees.199 Overall, the case is well-argued and advances a
position only recently recognized in the United States. Marouf’s
criteria suggest that Islam would be an ideal case to include
when making International Human Rights arguments in a
domestic violence-based asylum claim.
Practitioners may carefully incorporate foreign case law and
treaty interpretations into their arguments to buttress asylum
claims using the criteria advanced by Marouf to select cases that
are likely to be accepted by United States adjudicators. The
inclusion of these authorities benefits the individual asylum
applicant, and legitimizes the overall United States asylum
system.
IV.

EXAMPLES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS ARGUMENTS IN ASYLUM
ADJUDICATIONS

The preceding analysis reveals the many sources of
international human rights law practitioners can and should use
to bolster their asylum arguments and argue for favorable

197. Id.
198. See generally Robert Thomas, Consistency in Asylum Adjudication:
Country Guidance and the Asylum Process in the United Kingdom, 20 INT’L J.
REFUGEE L. 489 (2008); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Protected Characteristics and
Social Perceptions: An Analysis of the Meaning of ‘Membership of a Particular
Social Group’, in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNHCR’S
GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 263 (Erika Fuller et
al. eds., 2003).
199. From 2010-2014, the United Kingdom had a refugee population of
149,799. During the same period, the United States had a refugee population of
262,023. See Refugee Population by Country or Territory of Asylum, THE WORLD
BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SM.POP.REFG (last visited Feb. 17,
2015).
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interpretations of the definition of “refugee.” This section will
use two hypothetical fact patterns to construct international
human rights arguments based on the information provided in
Parts I, II, and III. Both hypotheticals present claims that have
not been resolved by the BIA or the federal courts as of early
2016. Part A evaluates the asylum claim of Ana, a Salvadoran
woman seeking protection from her abusive boyfriend, while
Part B examines the case of Santiago, a fourteen-year-old
Salvadoran youth seeking asylum due to gang recruitment.
These cases present novel arguments for resolving similar
claims.
A. ANA: A SALVADORAN WOMAN SEEKING PROTECTION FROM
HER ABUSIVE BOYFRIEND
1. Facts
Ana is a twenty-five-year-old woman fleeing her abusive
boyfriend, Alberto, in El Salvador. She and Alberto met three
years ago and moved in together shortly thereafter. According to
Ana, Alberto was a member of the MS-13 gang and a habitual
drunk. Ana originally became Alberto’s girlfriend out of fear that
members of the MS-13 gang would kill her if she refused. Alberto
frequently beat Ana with his fists. Once, while Alberto was
drunk, he shot at Ana with a pistol; the bullet grazed her hip.
Ana fled the house and went to the police, who laughed at Ana,
refused to file the report, and called Alberto to pick her up. After
picking her up, Alberto beat Ana unconscious. The next morning,
Ana fled to the United States with the help of her uncle. Ana is
filing for asylum as a member of the particular social group:
“Salvadoran women who are unable to leave their relationship.”
200

2. Using International Human Rights Arguments in Ana’s
Case
International law recognizes domestic violence as a form of
persecution. In its guidelines, the UNHCR declared that

200. The proposed particular social group of this hypothetical is
substantially similar to Matter of A-R-C-G-. See 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (B.I.A.
2014). The facts have been altered to provide a more novel discussion of the
hypothetical claim.
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“domestic violence . . . [is an act] which inflict[s] severe pain and
suffering—both mental and physical—and which ha[s] been
used as [a] form[] of persecution, whether perpetrated by State or
private actors.”201 Other international agreements and bodies
similarly recognize domestic violence as persecution. In General
Recommendation No. 32, the CEDAW Committee interpreted
“persecution” under the Refugee Convention to include “serious
forms of domestic violence.”202 The United Kingdom has
accepted this interpretation in its case law.203 Using these
arguments, it can be reasoned that Ana suffered “persecution”
under the Refugee Convention in the form of domestic violence.
Some courts may be hesitant to recognize a claim stemming
from cohabitation alone (i.e. when the victim was not married to
his or her persecutor). However, international human rights
treaties speak of the need for states to respect and enforce
equality between men and women—not just spouses.204 For
example, CEDAW states that women have a right to
“fundamental freedoms”—including freedom from domestic
violence—”irrespective of their marital status.”205 Therefore,
domestic violence includes violence between men and women
living together—regardless of the legal recognition of their
relationship. As Ana and Alberto cohabitate, Alberto’s violence
against Ana constitutes persecution. Ana does not need to show
a marital relationship in order to establish persecution or to
show that she is unable to leave her relationship for purposes of
her particular social group.

201. Guidelines on International Protection: Gender-Related Persecution,
supra note 101, at 3 (emphasis added).
202. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General
Recommendation No. 32, supra note 115, at para. 15.
203. See, e.g., Islam v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [1999]
2 WLR 1015 (HL) (UK).
204. See generally ICCPR, supra note 139, art. 3 (“The States Parties to the
present Covenant undertake to ensure the equal right of men and women to the
enjoyment of all civil and political rights set forth in the present Covenant.”);
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III), art. 2 (Dec. 10, 1948) (protecting “all of the rights and freedoms
set forth in [the] Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as . . . sex”).
205. CEDAW, supra note 112, art. 1.
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B. SANTIAGO: A FOURTEEN-YEAR-OLD SALVADORAN YOUTH
SEEKING ASYLUM DUE TO FORCED GANG RECRUITMENT.
1. Facts

Santiago is a fourteen-year-old Salvadoran youth seeking
asylum based on MS-13 gang recruitment. One day in October,
Xavier, a member of the MS-13 gang, approached Santiago while
he was on his way to school and demanded that he join the gang.
Santiago knew Xavier was a member of the MS-13 gang because
of his facial tattoos. Santiago refused to join the gang, telling
Xavier he wanted to continue going to school. Xavier proceeded
to beat Santiago with a pistol and rob him of his belongings.
From October to December, Xavier followed Santiago to school
and threatened to kill him if he did not join the gang. Finally,
Xavier and three other gang members kidnapped Santiago, tied
him up, and poured gasoline on him. Santiago was able to escape
and eventually fled to the United States. Santiago is filing for
asylum as a member of the particular social group: “Salvadoran
youth who oppose gang recruitment.”206
2. Using International Human Rights Arguments in
Santiago’s Case
As a child seeking asylum, Santiago is entitled to
heightened protections under international law. Both the
UNHCR and the CRC emphasize that in asylum cases, “the best
interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.”207 In
determining the “best of interests of the child,” asylum
adjudicators must consider “their age, their level of maturity and
development and their dependency on adults,” as well as “child
specific rights.”208 These child specific rights include, among
others, protection from violence, protection from under-age
recruitment, and the right to education.209 MS-13, and the El
206. The proposed particular social group of this hypothetical is
substantially similar to Matter of S-E-G-. See 24 I. & N. Dec. 579 (B.I.A. 2008).
The facts have been altered to provide a more novel discussion of the
hypothetical claim.
207. CRC, supra note 127, art. 3(1); accord Guidelines on International
Protection: Child Asylum Claims, supra note 109, at 4.
208. See Guidelines on International Protection: Child Asylum Claims, supra
note 109, at 3–4.
209. Id. at 8.
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Salvador government, violated all three of Santiago’s
fundamental rights. The Court and asylum officer must evaluate
Santiago’s claim in light of these denials of basic human rights
coupled with his age.
Furthermore, the UNHCR has concluded that the “agent of
persecution,” or “non-State actor,” can be a “criminal gang[]” for
the purposes of asylum:210
Where children are singled out as a target group for
recruitment or use by an armed force or group, they may
form a particular social group due to the innate and
unchangeable nature of their age as well as the fact that
they are perceived as a group by the society in which they
live . . . .[A] child who . . . refuses to become associated
with an armed force may be perceived as holding a
political opinion in which case the link to the Convention
ground of political opinion may also be established. 211
The CRC reinforces that a gang—as an armed group—can be an
agent of persecution. CRC Article 38 suggests that states have
an obligation under international law to prevent forced
recruitment of children by armed groups.212 El Salvador, as a
signatory of the CRC, has failed to protect children from gang
recruitment. As the MS-13 gang targeted Santiago for
recruitment, Santiago suffered persecution by a non-State actor.
In addition, Santiago’s particular social group, “Salvadoran
youth who oppose gang recruitment,” is socially distinct and
particular under international understandings of these terms.
The UNHCR emphasizes that age, and in particular “youth,” is
immutable, particular, and socially distinct.213 According to the
UNCHR guidelines:
[B]eing a child is in effect an immutable characteristic at
any given point in time. A child is clearly unable to
disassociate him/herself from his/her age in order to
avoid the persecution feared. The fact that the child
eventually will grow older is irrelevant to the
identification of a particular social group . . . .Being a
210. Id. at 16.
211. Id. at 20.
212. See CRC, supra note 127, art. 38.
213. See Guidelines on International Protection: Child Asylum Claims, supra
note 109, at 3–4.
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child is directly relevant to one’s identity, both in the eyes
of society and from the perspective of the individual
child . . . .In most societies, children are set apart from
adults as they are understood to require special attention
or care, and they are referred to by a range of descriptors
used to identify or label them, such as “young,” “infant,”
“child,” “boy,” “girl,” or “adolescent.” The identification of
social groups also may be assisted by the fact that the
children
share
a
common
socially-constructed
experience, such as being abused, abandoned
impoverished or internally displaced.214

The United Kingdom recognizes that although an applicant “will
in due course cease to be a child, he is immutably a child at the
time of assessment.”215 As Santiago was a child at the time of
filing, “youth” constitutes an immutable and particularlydefined characteristic. Furthermore, the UNHCR interprets
social visibility to encompass gang recruitment of children.216 As
discussed above, Article 38 of the CRC reinforces that forced
recruitment is socially recognizable in countries in which it is an
issue.217 Therefore, “Salvadoran youth who oppose gang
recruitment” meets the criteria of immutability, particularity,
and social distinction when these terms are interpreted using
international understandings of these terms.
Both Ana and Santiago’s cases utilize international human
rights arguments in emerging types of asylum claims. Although
international human rights law is only persuasive authority,
these types of arguments bolster their claims by demonstrating
to the adjudicator that international law generally favors
protection of these individuals. The use of international human
rights arguments is not limited to cases of domestic violence or
gang recruitment. Practitioners should carefully examine their
cases to see if international human rights arguments would
assist the adjudicator in more readily finding a “particular social
group” or “persecution.”
214. Id. at 19.
215. LQ (Age: Immutable Characteristic) Afghanistan v. Secretary of State
for the Home Department, [2008] UKAIT 00005, at 3, 15 Mar. 2007.
216. See Guidelines on International Protection: Child Asylum Claims, supra
note 109, at 20 (“Where children are singled out as a target group for
recruitment or use by an armed force or group, they may form a particular social
group due to the innate and unchangeable nature of their age as well as the fact
that they are perceived as a group by the society in which they live.”).
217. See CRC, supra note 127, art. 38.
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Conclusion
International sources such as the UNHCR handbook,
international human rights treaties, and foreign case law offer
interpretations of the 1980 Refugee Act’s more ambiguous
terms—particularly “particular social group” and “persecution.”
These interpretations aid in asylum claims—such as child
asylum claims or those founded on domestic violence—that have
yet to be fully explored in the United States. Without context,
adjudicators may have a difficult time understanding why an
asylum applicant’s claim articulates a particular social group or
persecution. International human rights treaties provide
practitioners with support for unique and persuasive arguments
to buttress their clients’ asylum claims. Reliance on
international human rights law is almost necessary whenever
approaching a case unfamiliar to U.S. immigration officials. New
refugee crises bring new forms of persecution and particular
social groups, all of which the adjudicator must assess under the
1980 Refugee Act.
From an overarching policy standpoint, the use of
international human rights law arguments serves a greater
purpose. As asylum adjudicators begin to see increased usage of
international law, they may become more comfortable relying on
UNHCR interpretations, treaties, and sister signatories’
interpretations of those treaties. Adjudicators will hopefully
adapt and more readily entertain these sorts of arguments.
Thus, the use of international human rights law is not only
beneficial for advocating on behalf of the individual client, but
for establishing a healthy and safe immigration system for
refugees as a whole.

